Saturday, February 23, 2013
R. v. MUSSA S/O GUNGACHUMA PANGA MASASI (1968) HCD 508
Crim. Sass. 159-D-68, 21/10/68, Georges C. J.
Accused was charged with murder and he pleaded guilty
to manslaughter, which plea was accepted. Returning from a pombe party one
night, the accused met on the path his elder brother, with whom he was on bad
terms. The brother apparently abused him, using the word “nyoka”, and attacked
him with an axe. The accused snatched the axe away from him, and following him,
beat him with a billhook. The brother died from the blows.
Held:
Accused was convicted on his own plea and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.
The court stated before sentencing; “I do not think in this case you were
defending yourself at all. If a man throws an axe at you and runs away, then
you can let him go, because he is running away, and he no longer has an axe, so
he is incapable of any longer launching an attack on you. And I find it
difficult to see how one can hope to hit another human being with a billhook
and not run the risk of seriously injuring him or killing him. It is a deadly
instrument … The only reason why I can accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter
in this case is the fact that in throwing an axe at you and lying in wait for you,
he was acting in a provocative manner, especially in circumstances where you
must have had a considerable amount of drink.”
R.v. JAPHET FUNGAMEZA (1968) HCD 462
Crim. Sass. 163 BUKOBA-67, 3/10/68, Bramble J.
Accused and three other Field Force Unit members were
on duty at Murongo Ferry, each armed with a rifle. On the night in question
they all talked around the camp-fire before returning to their tent. The
accused testified that on of them, Elias, had brought the pombe, “Moshi”, to
drink. A series of quarrels broke out between accused and Elias. In the first
of these, accused called Elias a “Muha”, and Elias replied that accused “had a
cut finger,” after which there was some mutual pushing, broken
Held:
Accused is guilty of murder. The pushing and the swear-words used during the
quarrel and the snatching of the lamp were not sufficient provocation to “bring
it within the definition so as to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter”.
If any provocation existed “It was not such as to warrant the accused using a
lethal weapon like a gun nor was it such as to arouse the passion of an
ordinary man. The accused himself being a policeman would be expected to act
with more discretion than any citizen can be expected.
R. v. MAHUMUDU S/O KIBWANA (1968) HCD 186
, Crim. Sass. 230-D-67, 15/2/68, Hamlyn J.
Accused ’s only possible defence to a murder charge
was that shortly before the killing he heard deceased say to someone else that
he (deceased) had signed a paper
authorizing the police to beat accused.
Held:
“As a general rule … spoken words alone cannot be the basis for provocation…
but variations of (the rule) may arise by virtue of the application of section
200 of the Penal Code in special instances among particular communities. Where
spoken words are accepted in customary view as constituting provocation, the
words must be of so devastating a character, of such over-bearing force, as to
shatter the self-control of a normal person of that community.” Accused was
convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer death by hanging.
R. v. HORRY (1952) N.Z.L.R. 111
Death-Instances under which it may be said to have be proven by circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding the fact that neither the body nor any trace thereof has ever been found, and that accused has not confessed to any wrongdoing.
*Cited in R. v. Amani Zephania Kimweri (1968) HCD 50
R. v. ONUFREJCZYK [1955] ALL E. R. 247
Death-Circumstances under which it may be said to have be proven by circumstantial evidence, notwithstanding the fact that
neither the body nor any trace thereof has ever been found, and that accused
has not confessed to any wrongdoing.
*Cited in R. v. Amani Zephania Kimweri (1968) HCD 50
*Cited in R. v. Amani Zephania Kimweri (1968) HCD 50
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